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ARTICLES
SHIFTING PARADIGMS: INSTITUTIONAL
ROLES IN A CHANGING WORLD*
MICHAEL P. MALLOY**
INTRODUCTION
N July 1944, the representatives of forty-four allied powers met in
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to plan the rebuilding of the interna-
tional economic system in anticipation of the successful conclusion of the
Second World War.' With greater or lesser enthusiasm, we now reach a
time when we may celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of that conference.
The accomplishments and setbacks of the system envisaged by that fate-
ful series of meetings invite study.2 This article focuses on shifts in the
paradigm3 of the international economic system envisaged by Bretton
Woods, moments of institutional crisis that test the vitality of the system
and its presuppositions. The article argues that a series of institutional
crises, some as yet unresolved, has fundamentally transformed the sys-
tem constructed at Bretton Woods and that its vitality rests on its ability
to maintain fidelity to its original values.
Part I of this article examines the problems addressed by the Bretton
Woods conference itself and attempts to identify some of the original
* Copyright (C) 1994 by Michael P. Malloy. This article is a longer version of an
address delivered to the Graduate Colloquium, Fordham University School of Law, in
October 1993. The author gratefully acknowledges the support of the administrative staff
of the Fordham University School of Law Graduate Program, and in particular the
efforts of Mrs. Estelle Fabian, Associate Director of the Graduate Program, without
which the preparation of the address and the article would have been impossible.
Portions of this article are drawn from teaching materials developed for a course on
International Financial Institutions that the author designed and conducted at the Morin
Center for Banking Law Studies, Boston University School of Law, and at Fordham.
The author thanks the Morin Center, and in particular Professor Dennis S. Aronowitz,
the founding Director of the Morin Center, for their generous and unstinting
encouragement and support in this regard.
** Professor of Law and Director of Graduate Studies, Fordham University School
of Law. J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1976; Ph.D., Georgetown University, 1983.
1. For a discussion of the design and objectives of the Bretton Woods Conference,
see Gerald M. Meier, The Bretton Woods Agreement-25 Years After, 23 Stan. L. Rev.
235, 237-45 (1971).
2. For what must be the leading work in English in this regard, with particular
emphasis on the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), see generally Richard W. Ed-
wards, Jr., International Monetary Collaboration (1985); see also John H. Jackson & Wil-
liam J. Davey, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations 251-359 (2d ed.
1986) (discussing international economic regulation and Bretton Woods System).
3. On the concept of a "paradigm shift," a notion borrowed from the philosophy of
science, see Michael P. Malloy, Can lOb-5 for the Banks? The Effect of an Antifraud
Rule on the Regulation of Banks, 61 Fordham L. Rev. S23, S25-S26 n.12 (1993).
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values underlying the Bretton Woods system.4 Part II reviews some of
the institutional crises that have caused paradigm shifts in the Bretton
Woods system of international economic regulation.5 Part III analyzes,
in more detail, a current situation that could lead to an institutional cri-
sis: the economic transformation of the fifteen republics of the former
USSR.6 Part IV concludes that this economic transformation need not
result in a paradigm shift, a "challenge" to the presuppositions that un-
derlie the current Bretton Woods institutions, but rather may be viewed
as an "opportunity" to vindicate the original values of those institutions.'
I. BRETTON WOODS AND ITS ORIGINAL VALUES
The Bretton Woods conference and the institutional solutions that
emerged from it must be understood against the background of interna-
tional events in the two decades preceding it.' In some respects, the pro-
ject of the conference was reactive: to reform the rubrics of international
finance and trade to eliminate what were perceived as harmful and preda-
tory practices prevalent during the 1930s. While some of these practices
certainly predate that decade, the worldwide depression of that period
encouraged the aggressive use of predatory finance and trade practices
and exacerbated the consequences of such practices.
International trade is an important component of balance of payments
between nations,9 and the resulting inflow and outflow of goods and pay-
ments has a significant effect on the condition of domestic economies.' 0
In this sense, nations are doubly interdependent. As a matter of fact,
economic events in one nation or region have a greater or lesser impact
on other nations or regions." As a matter of policy, strategies for eco-
nomic growth in any one nation or region must ultimately presuppose
4. See infra notes 8-65 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 66-81 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 82-108 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 109-118 and accompanying text. Compare the words of one com-
mentator who notes that :"the solution to this great challenge [of assisting the fifteen
republics in becoming integrated into the world economy] is within our reach-and.., it
can be an important part of a global strategy to revive growth in the world economy.
This challenge is an opportunity."
8. For a useful review and explanation of the historical impulses reflected in the
Bretton Woods conference, see Edwards, supra note 2, at 4-8 (discussing background of
conference and resulting institutions); Dominick Salvatore, International Economics 642-
45 (4th ed. 1993) (discussing Bretton Woods system as gold-exchange standard system
for oversight of rules of international trade and finance); Staff of the International Mone-
tary Fund, The Role and Function of the International Monetary Fund (1985) (explain-
ing origin of Bretton Woods system).
9. See Frederic S. Mishkin, The Economics of Money Banking and Finance 500-04
(3d ed. 1992) (discussing balance of payments methodology).
10. See Salvatore, supra note 8, at 1-4 (discussing international economic activity's
effect on national economies).
11. See id. at 4-6 ("[T]here are many ... crucial ways in which nations are interde-
pendent, so that economic events in one nation significantly affect other nations (and vice
versa).").
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and rely upon the conditions for economic growth in world markets,
given this interdependent situation. 12
With the constraints imposed by the worldwide depression, nations
came to rely to an ever-increasing extent on the manipulation of the ru-
brics of international finance and trade to reverse the deterioration of
their respective national economies. A few oversimplified examples may
suffice to illustrate the techniques of this manipulation.
Assume that domestic suppliers of widgets in Nusquam are not com-
petitive in relation to suppliers of widgets in Erewhon. In Nusquam, a
domestically produced widget ("N-widget") is priced at 20 Nusquami
Slugs ("S20"). In Erewhon, a domestically produced widget ("E-wid-
get") is priced at 10 Erewhoni Plugs ("P20"). The exchange ratio of
Slugs to Plugs is 1:1. Assuming comparable quality between N-widgets
and E-widgets and no transaction costs involved in importing E-widgets
into Nusquam,13 E-widgets priced at SlO should outsell N-widgets priced
at S20 in the Nusquami market. Correspondingly, N-widgets costing
P20 will not sell in the Erewhoni market."4
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12. Michel Camdessus, Economic Transformation in the Fifteen Republics of the
Former U.S.S.R.: A Challenge or an Opportunity for the World? 10 (address to Ge-
orgetown University School of Foreign Service, Apr. 15, 1992) ("In this interdependent
world, growth in any country-including the United States-is linked to the growth of
world markets.").
13. Even assuming reasonable transaction costs, E-widgets are likely to be more com-
petitively priced in the Nusquami market than N-widgets.
14. See Figure 1. Again, assuming reasonable transaction costs, the cost of N-widgets
in the Erewhoni economy are likely to be comparably affected to the added cost for E-
widgets in the Nusquami economy.
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In Erewhon, exporters of widgets will ultimately exchange their Slug
earnings into Plugs. Thus, the Erewhoni Government will have a charge
upon the Nusquami Government for the conversion of Slugs into Plugs,
gold, or some other convertible currency."
FIGURE 2
NUSQUAM $ EREWHON
S P
NUSQUAM EREWHON
CENTRAL CENTRAL
BANK BANK
s p
CONSUMER EXPORTER
< - ----- E-WIDGET
Let us further assume that the domestic widget suppliers are an impor-
tant sector of the Nusquami economy, which is relatively less developed
than that of Erewhon. The effects of this situation on Nusquam, particu-
larly in economically troubled circumstances, will be critical. The Nus-
quami Government may decide to remedy the situation by devaluing the
Slug and thus making the Slug to Plug exchange ratio 100:1.
The result is that N-widgets become more competitive compared to E-
widgets. In the Nusquami market, an N-widget still costs 520 while an
E-widget now costs S1000. Correspondingly, in the Erewhoni market,
an N-widget now costs P.20 while an E-widget still costs P10.' 6Widget
suppliers in Nusquam benefit, but widget consumers in Nusquam will
now pay at least 100 percent more for widgets. The effect in the Er-
ewhoni economy will be the reverse. Yet, the quality of the goods in-
volved remains unchanged.
The Erewhoni Government is unlikely to remain indifferent to this sit-
uation. It may counter by devaluing the Plug, at the very least to restore
the S:P exchange parity, but possibly to give an exchange advantage to
the Plug over the Slug. One can imagine a downward spiral of successive
devaluations. This process destabilizes the economies of both countries
15. See Figure 2.
16. See Figure 3.
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and may affect the economies of other nations as well.' 7
Another possible solution available to the Nusquami Government
would be to increase the cost of imported goods by establishing import
duties. The imposition of a 200 percent duty, for example, would in-
crease the cost of E-widgets in the Nusquami market from S10 to 530,
making them uncompetitive with respect to N-widgets still priced at 520.
Again, the effect is to increase the cost to Nusquami consumers by at
least 100 percent.18
Another alternative would be to impose a quota on the importation of
E-widgets. By the function of supply and demand, this should raise the
price of E-widgets in the Nusquami market and create some increased
market share for N-widgets. An extreme version of this would be to bar
the importation of E-widgets. Any of these alternatives is likely to
prompt a countermove by the Erewhoni Government to limit or exclude
17. This effect becomes even more evident if the Slug to Plug exchange ratio is estab-
lished indirectly through the pegging of each currency to some other measure of value,
for example gold or a convertible currency such as the U.S. dollar. In such a case, the
effect of devaluation is immediately and directly visited upon all other national currencies
similarly pegged. The adverse economic effects on international trade then spiral down-
wards in a broader arc.
18. Cf Sylvia Nasar, The High Price of Protectionism, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1993, at
D1 (discussing cost to consumers of tariffs and other trade barriers).
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N-widgets from its domestic market. As in the case of tariffs, non-tariff
barriers ("NTBs") to trade such as quotas will tend to push up the price
of goods to consumers within the importing country. 19
In abstract terms, the direct or indirect effects of any of these measures
is likely to be negative, either long or short term. Furthermore, if the
widget sector is an important component of Nusquami development
strategy, these measures may well have the unintended effect of retarding
development of the Nusquami economy.
Indeed, the significant adverse effects of such "beggar thy neighbor"
policies, both within individual national economies and in the less effi-
cient allocation of resources throughout the international system, in-
formed the approach taken at the Bretton Woods conference. The
essential project of the conference was to create an institutional setting in
which such predatory, and ultimately self-defeating, policies could be
contained or eliminated. The conference established other institutional
devices to address problems faced by relatively less developed or less
competitive national economies such as Nusquam.
It is against this background that the Bretton Woods system emerged.
The Articles of Agreement, or "Charter," of the International Monetary
Fund ("IMF") identified several institutional objectives.20 First, the
IMF would promote international cooperation by providing the institu-
tionalized machinery for consultation and collaboration of members on
international monetary issues.2 Second, the IMF would facilitate bal-
anced growth in international trade and thus contribute to higher levels
of employment, real income, and the development of productive capacity
of members.22 Third, the IMF would promote exchange stability, or-
derly exchange arrangements, and facilitate the avoidance of competitive
currency depreciation.23 Fourth, the IMF would foster a multilateral
system of payments and transfers for current transactions24 and would
seek to eliminate the use of exchange restrictions that might hinder the
growth of world trade.25 Fifth, the IMF would make convertible finan-
cial resources available to member states, on a temporary basis and with
19. In the case of tariff barriers there is at least some offsetting gain to the state treas-
ury from tariff revenues, as well as some minimal reduction in unemployment and welfare
benefit costs. See id. In the case of NTBs, however, the incremental increase in the cost
of the imported goods is captured by the importers and the foreign suppliers, not the state
treasury.
20. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, 60 Stat. 1401,
T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39 (opened for signature and entered into force Dec. 27,
1945), as amended, 20 U.S.T. 2775, T.I.A.S. No. 6748 (May 31, 1968; effective July 28,
1969), 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937 (Apr. 30, 1976; effective April 1, 1978) [herein-
after IMF Articles].
21. Id. art. I, i.
22. Id. art. I, iii.
23. Id. art. I, iii.
24. On the concept of "current transaction" for these purposes, see id. art. XXX(d).
25. Id. art. I, iv.
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appropriate safeguards,26 to permit these states to correct international
payment imbalances without resorting to destructive "beggar thy neigh-
bor" techniques.2 7 Finally, the IMF would seek to reduce the duration
and magnitude of such imbalances.28
At the technical level, these objectives were embodied in a number of
provisions of the IMF Charter. The IMF was given the authority to
supervise a code of conduct for exchange rate policies and restrictions on
payments for current account transactions.29 This authority was in-
tended to eliminate the possibility of predatory rate fluctuations and the
rigidity of close adherence to an exchange measure of value such as gold.
The Charter required each member to establish an exchange par value
for its currency in terms of gold or the United States ("U.S.") dollar as of
July 1, 1944.30 Having done so, the IMF Charter required the member
to maintain the market rate of the currency within one percent above or
below par.3" Par value could be changed only under specified conditions
and in accordance with specified procedures.32 Restrictive or discrimina-
tory exchange arrangements, on either a bilateral or regional basis,3"
were to be avoided but members experiencing dislocations as a result of
the war were permitted to continue current restrictions on a transitional
basis.34
Another goal of the IMF was to provide members with financial re-
sources, typically on a short term basis, to assist them in complying with
the exchange requirements while trying to correct or avoid trade imbal-
ances.35 The members' payments, in gold, convertible currencies, and
their own currencies, for their assigned subscriptions to the IMF created
these resources.3 6 Thus, these resources would be available to a mem-
ber-in the form of "credits" purchased with national currency, rather
than as loans 3 -on a short term basis to meet balance of payments
26. Regarding "conditionality" of drawing rights of members, see Edwards, supra
note 2, at 232-35.
27. See IMF Articles, supra note 20, art. I, v.
28. See id art. I, vi.
29. See id art. IV.
30. See id art. IV, 1 (a).
31. See id art. IV, 3.
32. See id art. IV, 5.
33. See id art. VIII, 3.
34. See id.
35. See id. art. I, 7 v-vi.
36. See id art. III, $ 3 (discussing subscriptions).
37. It is nevertheless common to see such transactions referred to as "borrowings" or
"loans." See, &g., Salvatore, supra note 8, at 645 (discussing "borrowing" from IMF).
Nevertheless, as a technical matter, member drawings on the IMF resources are "cast in
the form of a purchase [of convertible currency by the drawing member] and sale [by the
IMF] with a repurchase obligation." Edwards, supra note 2, at 223. Nevertheless, in
terms of the economic realities of the transaction, it is appropriate to view it as a loan,
since the "purchase" is made with the member's own currency, which, from the mem-
ber's point of view, is not a medium of exchange, and the "repurchase" by the IMF is, in
economic reality, a repayment of the proceeds of the original transaction by the member.
Cf Michael P. Malloy & James T. Pitts, Post-Mortem on Retail Repurchase Agreement"
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problems, with repayment of the credits in exchange for the member's
currency.38 Enlarged draws of these credits from successive "tranches"
of IMF resources would involve progressively restrictive conditions im-
posed by the IMF on the member's economic policies.3 9
A second institution emerged from the Bretton Woods conference, the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, commonly
called the World Bank." If the IMF is, in a sense, a central bank of
nations that oversees international financial and monetary policy, the
World Bank is a public international building and loan society. The
member states provide the capital of the World Bank, giving them the
right to borrow from the bank for the financing of development
projects.41
Several institutional objectives guide the World Bank. First, the
World Bank is to assist in reconstruction and development in member
states' territories by facilitating capital investment for productive pur-
poses.42 Second, the World Bank is to promote private foreign invest-
ment by means of guarantees or participations in loans and other
investments made by private investors.43 Where sufficient private capital
is not available, the bank may provide financing for productive purposes
out of its own capital, borrowed funds, or other resources." Third, the
World Bank is to promote long range balanced growth in international
trade and to maintain balance of payments equilibrium by encouraging
international investment for the development of members' productive re-
sources.45 Fourth, the World Bank must, as a basic operating principle,
arrange the loans made or guaranteed by it, in relation to international
loans from other sources, so that the more useful and urgent projects will
be dealt with first.46 Finally, the World Bank must conduct its opera-
tions "with due regard to the effect of international investment on busi-
ness conditions in the territories of members"47 and it was also to assist
in the smooth transition from a wartime economy to a post-World War
II peacetime economy.48
Where were the Regulators?, 3 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 89, 102-04 (1984) (arguing that
proper characterization of private sale/repurchase agreement is collateralized loan).
38. See IMF Articles, supra note 20, art. V, 7.
39. See id. art. V. See generally Salvatore, supra note 8, at 646 (describing progressive
"tranches" from which drawing are made and increased supervision and conditions im-
posed in each succeeding tranche).
40. See Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment, opened for signature and entered into force Dec. 7, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440,
T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, as amended, 16 U.S.T. 1942, T.I.A.S. No. 5929 (Dec.
17, 1965), Introductory Article [hereinafter IBRD Articles].
41. See id. art. II (membership and capital).
42. See id. art. I, i.
43. See id. art. I, ii.
44. See id.
45. See id. art. I, iii.
46. See id. art. I, iv.
47. Id. art. I, v.
48. See id.
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We can detect here an intentional interrelationship between the institu-
tional objectives of the IMF and the World Bank. For example, both
institutions have an interest in the development of productive capacity. 9
Both are concerned with promoting exchange stability."0 The IMF ad-
dresses the abuses of the inter-war period through regulation and over-
sight of exchange practices and provides short term relief for interim
problems of disequilibrium. The World Bank addresses nations' underly-
ing developmental concerns by providing direct and indirect assistance
without resort to the abuses of the inter-war period.
There was, however, a third perspective to the approach of the Bretton
Woods conference to the problems of economic interdependence: trans-
parency of trade. When national trade regulation and barriers to trade
are used to advance domestic development by beggaring one's neighbors,
efficient allocation of resources is impeded-that is, transparency of na-
tional borders for purposes of the transfer of goods and capital is oc-
cluded. In economic terms, it matters little whether this occlusion is the
result of predatory devaluation of currency or manipulation of trade
costs through protectionist trade barriers. Yet the third aspect of the
problem, maintaining the transparency of trade, had to be treated if the
dangers of the inter-war period were to be avoided.
To some extent, of course, both the IMF and the World Bank reflect a
concern with trade in their declared institutional purposes. Each is di-
rected by its charter to facilitate the development of balanced growth in
international trade."' However, for these institutions, such balanced
growth is at best an empirical by-product of their primary regulatory
mandates. The assumption of the Bretton Woods conference was that,
although the three elements of international economic regulation-fi-
nance, development, and trade-were necessarily interrelated, distinct
institutions would be created to oversee each element.5 2 Hence, a third
institutional device was required to address the maintenance of trans-
parency of trade directly.
This third institution was the International Trade Organization
("ITO"). 53 A charter for this organization was finally drafted in Havana
in 1948,14 but an increasingly protectionist U.S. Congress repudiated the
49. Compare IMF Articles, supra note 20, art. I, ii ("development of... productive
resources") with IBRD Articles, supra note 40, art. I, i ("development of productive
facilities"), art. I, ii ("finance for productive purposes"), art. 1, f iii ("development of
... productive resources").
50. Compare IMF Articles, supra note 20, art. I, iii ("promote exchange stability")
with IBRD Articles, supra note 40, art. I, iii ("maintenance of equilibrium in balances
of payments").
51. Compare IMF Articles, supra note 20, art. I, ii ("facilitate the expansion and
balanced growth of international trade") with IBRD Articles, supra note 40, art. I, ¢r iii
("promote long-range balanced growth of international trade").
52. See Edwards, supra note 2, at 5-6.
53. See ia at 6.
54. See Jackson & Davey, supra note 2, at 295.
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charter, which failed to achieve implementation.5 5 This was, in effect,
the first institutional crisis of the Bretton Woods system. The end result
was that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"),5 6 an
ostensibly transitional collection of international trade rules formulated
in 1947,17 substituted functionally for what was to have been a fully coor-
dinate institution within the Bretton Woods system.5"
Certain key provisions of the GATT address various aspects of the
beggar-thy-neighbor scenario that occluded the transparency of interna-
tional trade in the 1930s. For example, states that are contracting parties
of the GATT generally must accord "most-favored-nation" treatment to
all other contracting parties with respect to customs duties and
charges.59 A related rule generally requires "national treatment" of the
product of contracting parties, that is, nondiscriminatory treatment in
relation to like domestic products, with respect to internal taxes and
other internal charges."° The GATT also generally prohibits quotas and
similar quantitative restrictions on imports.6" The GATT subjects ex-
port subsidies to regulation and oversight by the contracting parties en
banc.62
Even with such limiting rules in place, transparency of international
trade could not be achieved since the contracting parties already had in
place broad and significantly restrictive tariff systems applicable to im-
ports of goods into their respective territories. The major affirmative
project undertaken by the GATT, therefore, was the progressive elimina-
tion of tariffs.63 This project has continued through seven successive
rounds of negotiations' 4 and is now confronting the rarified issues of the
eighth round, which had sought to extend GATT principles to such pre-
viously uncovered areas as trade in services, agricultural products, for-
eign investment, and intellectual property rights, as well as to improve
the GATT's rather cumbersome dispute settlement procedures.65
55. See id.
56. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (1947) (as amended)
[hereinafter GATT].
57. See id. art. XXIX (relation of GATT to ITO Charter).
58. On the operations of the GATT, see Edwards, supra note 2, at 63-68; Salvatore,
supra note 8, at 272-79.
59. See GATT, supra note 56, art. I.
60. See id. art. III; see also id. art. XIII (nondiscriminatory administration of quanti-
tative restrictions on imports and exports); art. XIV (exceptions to nondiscrimination
rules).
61. See id. art. XI.
62. See id. art. XVI. Cf id. art XVIII (rules for governmental assistance to economic
development).
63. See id. art. II (schedule of initial tariff concessions).
64. See, e.g., Salvatore, supra note 8, at 273-75 (describing seven completed rounds of
tariff negotiations).
65. See id. at 278-79 (discussing prospects for success of eighth "Uruguay Round").
1920 [Vol. 62
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II. INSTITUTIONAL CRISES AND PARADIGM SHIFTS
Even in its formative period, the Bretton Woods system of interna-
tional economic regulation was subjected to an institutional crisis that
altered the structure of the system. The refusal of the U.S. Congress to
implement the ITO Charter caused a structural realignment in the sys-
tem. The result was the persistence of the GATT as a curious hybrid,
lacking many of the formal characteristics of an "international organiza-
tion"66 but nonetheless functioning as a coordinate institution within the
system.67 This Part of the article reviews some of the other past institu-
tional crises that may have caused paradigm shifts in the Bretton Woods
system of international economic regulation.
A. Repudiation by the Eastern Bloc
While the conference participants contemplated that the Bretton
Woods system would be a set of "universal," though specialized institu-
tions, the repudiation of membership by most Eastern Bloc countries,
including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ("USSR"), robbed the
system of the general applicability originally contemplated.68 Only now,
in the aftermath of the political transformation of Central Europe and
the political collapse of the USSR, is this distortion of the system being
rectified.
B. Aggressive Use of Exchange Controls
Despite expectations that exchange controls would have limited utility
within the rules of the IMF Charter, the opposite has generally been the
case. Exchange controls and exchange arrangements have persisted, de-
spite their ostensibly "transitional nature," under the charter. 69 Further,
states have often employed them as economic sanctions.70 Indeed, states
have made attempts to enforce such controls transnationally through
provisions of the IMF Charter requiring member deference to such con-
66. See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 679-81 (3d ed. 1979)
(identifying traditional criteria of legal personality in international organizations as per-
manent associations of states with legal objects and organs, distinction between the or-
ganization and its members, and internationally exercisable legal powers).
67. For a discussion of the role of the GATT, see William A. Lovett, The Current
World Trade Agenda: GATT, Regionalism, and Unresolved Asymmetry Problems, 62
Fordham L. Rev. 2001 (1994).
68. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 2, at 24-25 (discussing varying attitudes of Eastern
Bloc countries to IMF prior to collapse of USSR).
69. IMF Articles, supra note 20, art. VIII, 2(a) (prohibition of restrictions on cur-
rent payments). One stated exception to this prohibition is during periods when the IMF
itself is experiencing a scarcity in its holdings of a particular member's currency. See id.
art. VII, 3. Another exception is for "transitional arrangements" for exchange restric-
tions, subject to a requirement of notification to the IMF. See id. art. XIV, r 2. A final
exception is for supervision by the IMF. See id art. XIV, I 3.
70. See Michael P. Malloy, Economic Sanctions and U.S. Trade 594-610 (1990 &
1993 Cum. Supp.) (discussing prevalence of currency restrictions as sanctions and rela-
tion between economic sanctions and IMF procedures).
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trols where imposed consistent with the charter. 7' Thus, the practice
concerning exchange controls under the IMF Charter would not seem
consistent with the underlying charter objective of eliminating restric-
tions on current financial transactions. 72
C. 1971 Convertibility Crisis
The U.S. decision in 1971 to devalue the dollar and to refuse to allow
redemption of dollars for gold represented the clearest example of an
institutional crisis leading to a paradigm shift.73 The immediate result
was that the international monetary system was adrift throughout much
of the 1970s and was reformulated by the end of the decade in several
very significant ways.
Instead of the system of exchange parities established in the original
version of the IMF Charter, a system of "managed floats" was estab-
lished.74 In addition, gold and the dollar have largely been replaced as
the exchange system "pegs" in favor of the IMF-generated "special
drawing right" ("SDR"), which is essentially a measure of value repre-
senting the value of a "basket" of currencies designated by the IMF.7'
While this system, to some degree, has made the exchange rate system
relatively less stable, the system is also less susceptible to the sort of crisis
precipitated by the U.S. action in 1971.
D. 1982 LDC Debt Crisis
The LDC debt crisis, beginning in 1982 with Mexico's announcement
that it would not service its external debt, was and continues to be a
major institutional crisis for both the IMF and the World Bank.76 It
remains a crisis-even if we may have become accustomed to living with
it. It has heightened interest in the management and oversight of the
global banking market, and one may reasonably ask what role the IMF
71. See Richard W. Edwards, Jr., Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Iranian As-
sets Control Regulations, 75 Am. J. Int'l L. 870, 873 (1981); see also Gerhard Wegen, The
Practical Implications of Article V11L2.b., 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1931 (1994).
72. Cf supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text (discussing IMF objectives).
73. For a discussion of the background of the President's decision to "close the gold
window" and to impose other financial measures, including an import surtax, see United
States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (upholding President's impo-
sition of the surtax). As Edwards has pointed out, it was not the refusal to redeem dollars
for gold, but the accompanying refusal to intervene in the exchange markets to maintain
dollar exchange rates within the limits then required by Article IV that constituted a
violation of the IMF Charter. See Edwards, supra note 2, at 497-98.
74. See Dominick Salvatore, The International Monetary System: Past, Present, and
Future, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1975 (1994).
75. See Figure 4, infra. On the SDR as the principal reserve asset in the international
monetary system, see Edwards, supra note 2 at 635-38.
76. On the LDC debt crisis and some regulatory responses to it, see Michael P. Mal-
loy, The Regulation of Banking 952-54 (1992).
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should take in regulating this market."
The crisis also precipitated a paradigm shift with respect to the relative
FIGURE 4
SDR Valuation Basket
(As of January 1, 1991)
Percentage Amount of
Currency Weight Currency Units
U.S. dollar 40 0.572
Deutsch mark 21 0.453
Japanese yen 17 31.8
French franc 11 0.800
Pound sterling 11 0.0812
roles of the IMF and the World Bank. Despite the original expectation
that the IMF would be involved in relatively short-term adjustment
assistance, while the World Bank would be involved in long-term re-
source commitments, particularly in support of developmental projects,
it may be that the two institutions have drifted into each other's respec-
tive areas of concern.78
E. Increasing Prominence of Regionalism
Cutting away from the universal and generally applicable character of
the Bretton Woods system, the increasing prominence of regionalism in
international economic arrangements, particularly in the area of interna-
tional trade, also poses an institutional crisis for the system. Current and
proposed regional arrangements do not have the precise symmetrical fit
exhibited by the Bretton Woods model of international economic regula-
tion.79 As these regional approaches continue to gain prominence, they
are likely to require a reassessment of some underlying premises of the
Bretton Woods system.80
77. See Stephen T. Zamora, Regulating the Global Banking Network-What Role (If
Any) for the IMF?, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 1953 (1994).
78. See Dominique Carreau, Why Not Merge the IMF and the World Bank?, 62 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 1989 (1994). See also Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, Aiding the Transformation of
Economier Has the Fund Become a Development Bank and the World Bank the Fund?,
62 Fordhan L. Rev. 1943 (1994) (discussing institutional interrelationship between IMF
and World Bank).
79. See Lovett, supra note 67, at 2004-12 (discussing problems of asymmetry in inter-
national trade).
80. In particular, the objective of transparency of national boundaries with respect to
international trade is put into question by regionalization trends. Indeed:
[t]he trend toward regional integration accelerated in 1992 both among indus-
trial countries and developing countries. This reflected partly a deepening of
existing trade arrangements and partly the stalemate in the Uruguay Round [of
19231994]
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III. ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF THE FORMER USSR
We are therefore dealing with a system of international economic regu-
lation that has suffered considerable strains over the past fifty years. In-
tervening events have partially frustrated or reshaped some of its original
objectives. This Part of the article analyzes in more detail a current situ-
ation that could lead to an institutional crisis: the economic transforma-
tion of the fifteen republics of the former Soviet Union ("FSU"). 81
This crisis invites an obvious question: aside from its sheer size, what
is so distinctive about the economic development project represented by
the transformation of the FSU republics 82 that creates a potential crisis
for the Bretton Woods system? One aspect of particular note here is the
geopolitical linkage of-the development project. Success of the political
transformation of this Cold War nemesis depends, in no small part, on
the success of the economic transformation. 3
A second aspect that distinguishes this project is its challenge to devel-
opmental theory. On such a relatively grand scale, with a correspond-
ingly narrower margin of error,84 assumptions about developmental
GATT trade negotiations]-which intensified fears of unilateral defensive trade
actions and the need to increase bargaining power vis-a-vis other trading blocs,
especially with the advent of the European single market and the North Ameri-
can Trade Agreement.
IMF, Annual Report 16 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Report].
81. The terminology used to refer to the former republics has varied, but the IMF has
lately adopted "FSU" as the operative term. See, e.g., IMF, International Financial Sta-
tistics: Supplement on Countries of the Former Soviet Union ix (Supp. Series No. 16,
1993) (presenting microeconomic data and explaining notes pertaining to 14 FSU coun-
tries) [hereinafter FSU Supplement].
82. See, e.g., Camdessus, supra note 12, at I (noting that "magnitude of the problems
facing the 15 republics is unprecedented").
83. See Jorge Braga de Macedo, Comments, in Georg Winckler, Central and Eastern
Europe Roads to Growth 138 (1992). He writes:
Economic agents will not change their behavior if they do not believe that the
policy environment has also changed irreversibly .... [A] move to free trade
that is thought to be temporary will be welfare worsening .... Self-fulfilling
expectations make reforms enduring if they are based on the rule of law....
Id. at 140; see also Georg Winckler, Roads to Growth: A Summary of Main Issues, in
Georg Winckler, supra, at 4 (noting that "widespread distrust in the success of economic
transition may further destabilize politics"); Thomas Friedman, U.S. Asks Allies to Help
Speed LM.F Aid to Russia, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1994, at A6, col. 1 (indicating U.S.
concern over political need to support Russian reform efforts with immediate economic
assistance).
84. One may think of the margin of error with respect to developmental strategies
applied to this project in the following terms: when the instrumentalities of the Bretton
Woods System are applied to a developmental project in a national economy of relatively
small size, the effects of failure of development presumably have a correspondingly small
impact on other "globalized" or interdependent economies. Hence, what is at risk is the
economic and social gains of the development target economy, and the incremental eco-
nomic gain of other interdependent economies. In the case of the FSU republics, how-
ever, the potential economic and social gains of the development target economies and
the attendant economic gain of other interdependent economies are likely to be of a much
greater scale, and hence the lost opportunities and negative economic effects of failure of
the developmental project are likely to be significantly greater.
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theory underlying the Bretton Woods System are put at risk. Thus, to
the extent that these assumptions include the notions that stabilizing ex-
change rates and exchange rate policies leads to significant positive ef-
fects systemically,85 and that the encouragement and enhancement of
private investment are likely to lead to the realization of the policy values
of the Bretton Woods System in the development target, 6 the challenge
of transforming or reforming the economies of the FSU republics puts
these notions to the acid test.
A third aspect that distinguishes this project from others is the practi-
cal circumstance that the economic situation in the FSU republics in
many significant respects provides almost no economic infrastructure or
preexisting practices from which development can proceed. A few exam-
ples in this regard may illustrate the point. By Western standards, there
are practically no economic instrumentalities from which to build. Ex-
change rate policies and practices need to be reconstructed almost in
their entirety." The legal infrastructure with respect to investment and
industrial property ownership has to be created virtually de novo. s8 The
banking system is, by almost any objective estimation, in a primitive
state.89 This situation creates a radical challenge for development. De-
85. See e.g., IMF Articles, supra note 20, art. I(iii); see also IMF, World Economic
Outlook 6 (May 1993) ("The early experience of the former centrally planned economies
has already demonstrated the crucially important link between structural reforms,
macroeconomic stabilization, and successful economic transformation.") [hereinafter
May Outlook].
86. See eg., IBRD Articles, supra note ?, art. I(ii).
87. See FSU Supplement, supra note 82, at ix-x (discussing exchange rate policies of
FSU republics).
88. See e.g., IMF, World Economic Outlook 48 (October 1992) (discussing recent
FSU legislation) [hereinafter October Outlook].
In general .... the establishment of property rights and reform of the legal
system [in the FSU republics] to provide an adequate framework for market
activity have only just begun, including the removal of the multitude of an-
ticompetitive laws and restrictive practices that have been in place for most of
this century. Except in the Baltic states, there is limited knowledge of market-
oriented legal systems and no modem legal tradition to draw upon.
Id. The situation has improved very little since October 1992. See May Outlook, supra
note 86, at 64.
Most countries of the former Soviet Union and Mongolia have begun to put
commercial legislation in place, including property, bankruptcy, and antimono-
poly laws. But the application of this legal framework has been uneven. Prop-
erty rights are still inadequate and unclear, with the result that investment and
production decisions have been delayed. Monopoly laws have not been en-
forced[,] and the trade regime is still too distorted to provide much of a check
on monopoly power.
Id. This situation is complicated by the intransigence of the Russian foreign debt situa-
tion. See, e.g., Russian Debt Accord Elusive, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1993, at 8, col. 6; see
also FSU Supplement, supra note 82, at xv (discussing foreign assets and liabilities).
89. See; e.g., Tim Carrington, Former Soviet Banking System Needs Big Dose of Reso-
lution Trust Medicine, Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 1993, at A8, col. 3 (discussing critical condi-
tion of the banking system in the FSU republics); see also FSU Supplement, supra note
82, at x-xi (discussing current condition of banking systems in FSU republics and diffi-
culty of analyzing money and banking statistical data in light of that condition); 1993
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velopment must not simply aid in the building of an economy but must
assist in the creation of the factual predicates from which development
might emerge.
A. The Geopolitical Linkage
The geopolitical implications of the multilateral response to develop-
ment in the FSU republics raises the stakes considerably. Recently, in-
creased political turmoil in Russia has resulted, in no small part, from
the perceived failure of developmental objectives." What may be even
more disturbing is the recent dismissal and indictment of the reform-
minded president of the Republic of Belarus, a state that would otherwise
be a prime candidate for development,9 apparently resulting from simi-
lar public dissatisfaction with the slow pace of development. 92 A decisive
failure of developmental efforts in the FSU republics would almost un-
doubtedly result in a terrible revanchisme of autocratic rule and possibly
a resurgence of Russian expansionism.93
Report, supra note 81, at 50 (finding weak Latvian banking system an "area of major
concern").
Some efforts have already been undertaken in this regard, but with uncertain results at
this stage. See generally Inna Vysman, The New Banking Legislation in Russia: Theoreti-
cal Adequacy, Practical Difficulties, and Potential Solutions, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 265(1993) (discussing practical shortcomings of new bank regulatory initiatives in Russia).
The critical underdevelopment of the banking system in the FSU republics is one of the
major contributing factors to the slow pace of economic development.
Perhaps the major reason that firms extend credit [to trading partners] through
arrears is that failure to do so would disrupt supplies or shipments of inputs
needed for production, resulting in closure. Normally, a creditworthy firm
could fill the gap through the banking system. In the former Soviet Union,
however, the financial system is still underdeveloped. In any case, it would be
difficult for a bank (or another firm) to determine an enterprise's creditworthi-
ness because of the rudimentary accounting system, the absence of a market to
evaluate assets, the presence of soft budget constraints, and the possibility of a
government bailout.
May Outlook, supra note 86, at 61-62.
90. See, e.g., Steven Erlanger, Finance Minister Shuns Yeltsin Plea and Quits Cabinet,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1994, at Al, col. 6 (discussing political struggle within Russian
cabinet over pace and direction of economic reform); Steven Greenhouse, LM.F. Meeting
Backs Yeltsin, With a Caveat, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1993, at All, col. 4 (indicating
Western finance ministers' support Yeltsin in his confrontation with Russian Parliament
but with strong demand for economic reforms).
91. See FSU Supplement, supra note 82, at 10-13 (financial statistics on Belarus devel-
opment); see also Douglas Jehl, Clinton Promises Help for Belarus Before Changing Focus
to Mideast, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1994, at 1, col. 3 (proposing economic aid for Belarus).
92. See Belarus Parliament Ousts Leader, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1994, at A6, col. I(reporting ouster of Stanislav Shushkevich, Chairman of Parliament). But cf Steven
Erlanger, Belarus Says Aide's Ouster Won't Stop Reform, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1994, at
A6, col. 4 (reporting Belarussian Foreign Ministry insistence that ouster would not alter
commitment to market economy).
93. See, e.g., Adi Ignatius, New Shade of Red: With Russian Reform Waning, Com-
munists Mount a Comeback, Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1994, at 1, col. 1 (discussing resurgence
of Communist Party in light of continuing economic hardships).
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B. Challenges to Development Theory
.The wide disparity among the relative stages of economic development
of the FSU republics poses yet another problem.94 It complicates the
task of creating a multilateral response to the developmental problems of
the FSU.95 For instance, among the Baltic states, Estonia has so far suc-
cessfully proceeded with its economic stabilization and reform program,
achieving in 1993 "substantial moderation in the rate of inflation, grow-
ing confidence in the [Estonian currency], and the rapid growth of trade
with industrial countries." 96 Similarly, Latvia has experienced marked
economic improvement, based largely upon "strong monetary discipline,
underpinned by a prudent fiscal policy and supporting incomes policy
measures." 97 Only Lithuania appeared to be subject to substantial eco-
nomic setbacks by early 1993.98
Intrusive exchange practices and inadequate payments systems con-
tinue to impede trade liberalization in the other FSU republics.99 Russia,
in particular, is beset with significant impediments to economic develop-
ment.10°  Other states, such as Armenia,""1 Azerbaijan,10 2  and
94. See 1993 Report, supra note 81, at 15.
Progress in reform of trade and payments regimes has varied in the Baltic states
and the states of the former Soviet Union. The Baltic states achieved the great-
est progress in reorienting their policies toward market mechanisms, as part of
comprehensive economic reforms supported by the use of Fund resources.
Id. Other states of the former Soviet Union have experienced greater difficulties in re-
orienting their trade regimes.
95. See, e.g., Camdessus, supra note 12, at 3.
This diversity [of resources among the FSU republics] requires that the reform
programs reflect the republics' special circumstances. They need to develop a
diversified strategy that responds to their own circumstances.
ML The disparities in natural resources and other physical circumstances likewise com-
plicates matters. Thus, some FSU republics are resource-rich. See, eg., Turkmenistan
Oil Deal, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1993, at DlI, col. 6 (reporting Occidental Petroleum
Corporation's successful bid to explore and develop oil deposits). Others are relatively
resource-scarce. See, e.g., Erlanger, supra note 93, at A6, col. 6 (noting Belarussian en-
ergy dependency on Russia). These FSU republics, however, may have other advantages
such as strategic location along transportation and supply routes. See. e.g., Jehl, supra
note 92, at 10, col. 1 (providing map of Belarus indicating major regional railroad
corridor).
96. See 1993 Report, supra note 81, at 49.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 50.
99. See, e.g., id. at 15 (noting that FSU republics "have adopted a number of transi-
tional payments arrangements that have posed an obstacle to effective import liberaliza-
tion"). National systems for international trade and customs practices are also very
uncertain among the FSU republics. See FSU Supplement, supra note 82, at xii.
100. The IMF noted several problems, as of April 1993, including "the difficult condi-
tions under which the [Russian] authorities had sought to implement stabilization poli-
cies and transform the economic system; [and] the dangers of financial instability, which
was threatening to undermine the thrust of the entire [economic] reform program.
See 1993 Report, supra note 81, at 50.
101. See id. at 51 (noting "the desperate economic situation.., and the unprecedented
decline in living standards").
102. See id. (noting "recent deterioration, particularly in budget performance").
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Moldova 103 are in an especially perilous condition, in part because of
internal violence." °4
C. The Economic Infrastructure
Trade liberalization of central and eastern European economies in
transition has been a particular focus of concern in recent international
assessments of the situation in that area of the world. 105 This aspect of
development has exposed some of the shortcomings in the economic in-
frastructures of these economies. For example, "difficulties in developing
an adequate domestic revenue base and effective tax collection system are
emerging as constraints on the sustainability of trade liberalization."', 6
Furthermore, the economic situations within and among many of the
FSU republics, excluding the Baltic states, have actually deteriorated in a
number of significant ways that are likely to make development even
more difficult to effect. 107
IV. ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION AND THE VINDICATION OF THE
ORIGINAL VALUES OF BRETTON WOODS
The challenge presented by the ongoing economic transformation of
the FSU republics need not be viewed as a potential paradigm shift-not
a challenge to the presuppositions that underlie the current Bretton
Woods institutions-but rather, these may represent an opportunity to
vindicate the objectives of those institutions. Whether those objectives
are to be vindicated may depend, however, on the extent to which the
Bretton Woods institutions, particularly the IMF, are willing to assume a
proactive and primary role in the economic transformation. To date,
there are reasons to doubt whether the institutions are willing to under-
take such a role.
As late as April 1992, the Managing Director of the IMF delivered a
formal address that seemed to commend the FSU republics to their own
devices.108 He repeatedly emphasized:
Now comes the question of what [the economic transformation] will
103. See id. at 52 (noting "a precipitous decline in GDP, financial imbalances, rapid
inflation, a severe deterioration in . . .terms of trade, and an acute foreign exchange
shortage").
104. See Camdessus, supra note 12, at 2.
105. See, e.g., 1993 Report, supra note 81, at 15 (discussing global economy and trade
liberalization in economies in transition).
106. Id.
107. See id. This report noted:
Trade among the states of the former Soviet Union continued to decline sharply
during 1992 and early 1993, as did their trade with the rest of the world. This
partly reflected, and contributed to, the decline in economic activity across the
former Soviet Union .... Many of these states have resorted to barter (includ-
ing barter with countries outside the area of the former Soviet Union) ....
Id.
108. See Camdessus, supra note 12, at 6.
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cost. Let me stress a basic fact. The transformation of the economies
of the 15 republics is essentially their task. International financial
assistance is critical, but it can only be a complement to their efflorts,
their savings, their investment in infrastructure and in expanding the
productive base of the economy.... Yes, they will do the work. And
history shows us that is how economic transformation happens.1°9
Ironically, this pronouncement on economic history contradicts the
opening insight of the address. He acknowledged that "[tihe magnitude
of the problems facing the 15 republics is unprecedented. The challenge
goes far beyond what is generally understood by the concept of economic
transformation." 1 0 How is it then, if the challenge transcends our pre-
supposed notions of economic transformation, that the FSU republics are
to be constrained by past experience with economic transformation?
The economic transformation that must occur in the FSU republics is
fundamentally different from the problems that ordinarily confront de-
velopmental tacticians. It is not a situation calling for concentrated eco-
nomic adjustment efforts along a continuum of development. Rather, it
is a situation requiring a fundamental reconstruction of entire societies in
all their legal, economic, and physical dimensions. By treating the chal-
lenge presented by the FSU republics as simply another, albeit larger,
example of economic adjustment, the Managing Director makes it, in
broad outline, indistinguishable from all other economic adjustment
challenges facing the Bretton Woods institutions. Thus, he observed:
Because the IMF is a universal institution, we must consider these new
demands in a global context and try to reconcile them with the other
challenges to the world economy:
" the heavy investments needed in the industrial countries them-
selves, to support their own growth in the decade ahead;
" the investment needs of the developing countries, to promote
their development, protect the environment, reduce poverty,
and complete the job of solving the debt problem .... III
This homogenization of the varied challenges presented by economic
transformation of the FSU republics and other continuing developmental
problems is misplaced and dangerous. Without appropriate attention to
the preeminent challenge represented by the critical situation in the FSU
republics, there exists the very real possibility of fundamental instability
in international peace and security surpassing even the pre-transforma-
tion period of the Cold War. Furthermore, this undifferentiated ap-
proach to current developmental problems subverts a key, original value
of the Bretton Woods System: the priority of reconstruction over
development., 2
109. Id
110. Id at 1.
111. I at 7.
112. Compare the IBRD Charter which states:
The purposes of the Bank [for Reconstruction and Development] are:
1994] 1929
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
The Bretton Woods System presupposed that reconstruction would
naturally precede broader development efforts.' 13 In the case of the FSU
republics, however, that presupposition went seriously awry.'" 4 In a very
real sense, they have existed in a state of suspended animation, never
enjoying the post-war reconstruction that revitalized Western Europe.
With that suspension now reversed, priority should be given to their re-
construction. Unfortunately, with the relative realignment of the role of
the World Bank, originally charged with the reconstruction and develop-
ment objectives of the System,' 15 has caused these functions to appar-
ently fall to the IMF, without the direct application of the World Bank's
charter commitment to the priority of reconstruction efforts over devel-
opmental projects. This "lowest common denominator" approach to the
critical task of economic transformation to the FSU republics may ulti-
mately fail its fundamental purpose." 6 In that case, we may see the time
when, economically and possibly politically, the call may go out to "[c]ry
Havoc, and let slip the dogs of war.""'
(i) To assist in the reconstruction and development of territories of mem-
bers by facilitating the investment of capital for productive purposes, includ-
ing the restoration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war, the
reconversion of productive facilities to peacetime needs and the encourage-
ment of the development of productive facilities and resources in less devel-
oped countries.
(v) To conduct its operations with due regard to the effect of interna-
tional investment on business conditions in the territories of members and,
in the immediate post-war years, to assist in bringing about a smooth transi-
tion from a wartime to a peacetime economy.
IBRD Articles, supra note ?, art. I, 1 % i, v (emphasis added).
113. See id.
114. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (describing Eastern Bloc repudia-
tion of Bretton Woods System).
115. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
116. The IMF has already been subjected to growing criticism over its handling of the
economic transformation of the FSU republics. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 84, at A6
(discussing U.S. concern over delays in IMF assistance to Russia).
117. William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act III, at 273 (A.L. Rowse ed., 1978).
[Vol. 621930
